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ETHICAL AND EPISTE MIC DILEMMAS OF BEHAVIORISM 
AND THE IDENTITY THESIS 
by 
George J. Stack 
In the:: prccccding discussions Professors Shaffer and Firth have raised significant 
questionc; concerning the ethical and epistemological implications of some rather 
popu lar philosophical interpretations of, or treatmen ts of. the tradi·tional mind· 
body problem. These questions or dilemmas seem to conspire to undermine either 
the consistency or credibility of the basic assumptions of both behaviorism and 
materialism (as expressed in the identity thesis). While I would agree with both 
Shaffer and Firth that some form of dualism seems to be intimately associated with 
our conceptions of moral responsibility or with more or less universal moral 
sentiments or judgments, I would bold that since all of the relevant evidence is oot 
yet in concerning the plausibility of a materialistic account of human behavior, a 
pro' il.ional dualism may be a more cautious position to adopt at this time. This 
caution is determined not only by the possibility that overhwelming evidence may 
be attained tn/uturo concerning the validity of the identity thesis. but aJso because 
the general question of the fundamental basis of aJI human functioning is related to 
a pre�ent stage of scientific (e.g .. physiological) de"elopment and is. hence. subject 
to rt\ision in the future. 
My basic ob1ect1on to Jerome Shaffer's arguments concerning the difficulties 
"' hich a beha,iorist or identity theorist would encounter in regard to question of 
lhe ' 1olations or a moral principle which has a high degree or uni,ersality is that it 
approaches the entire difficulty from a circuitous direction. For, the immorality of 
nn act as 'icious as that described by Shaffer is not wholly embodied in the 
prese nce or absence of pain behavior. Thus, an individual capable of unusual self· 
control or stoical endurance might not exhibit pai n behavior under the cir· 
cumstunces described and yet wc would deem this unjustified inCliction of suffering 
an immoral action because or the intention of the individua l inflicting such suf· 
fcring. l f  one is ltCeking to determine the locus, as it were. of the intrinsic wrongness 
<)f such actions, one must look to the agent and his intentions. not to physical 
re\ponses of the ' ictim. 
The questions of the responsibility and the intentions of the agent seem more 
appropriate for making the central issue in"olved in the general problem more 
'isible and p1 ecise. If a person or a self cannot choose or decide what to do on any 
ghen occa�ion, and if we are only concerned with the interaction of two physio­
chemical "mechanisms" which are responding to stimuli O\'er which they 
presumably have no control. the entire question of moral judgment or ethical 
pre cription 1s irrelevant. The presumption of intentional choice and action is 
central to the assumption that men can act in accordance with the kind of universal 
moral principle that Shaffer has formulated. It is at this point that the postulation of 
some form of dualism seems to be called for in this analysis of the ethical im· 
plications of either a strict beha\iorism or materialism. Neither the strict 
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behaviorist nor the identicy theorist can pro"ide an adequate explanation of the 
initiation. or choices or actions and, hence, i I is difficult for anyone holding such 
positions to ascribe responsibility to anyone. Pain behavior or the stimulation of 
certain parts of the brain have no moral or ethically relevant dimension at alt 
The assumption chat A can cause undesen•ed suffering in another is the crucial 
one (not the question of the physiological effects or some actions) since it 
presupposes that someone has initialed an intended action. To overemphasize the 
effects produced by an action is misleading since it is conceivable Lhat similar 
undesirable effects (e.g .. pain behavior or the stimulation of, say, the C - fibers of 
the brain) could be produced in another by involuntary or unintentional behavior. 
Thus, for example, an epileptic who had ingested too much alcohol may suddenly 
begin to attack violently a nearby person and induce pain behavior in another or 
"cause" those specific brain-scares in another which are experienced as pain even 
though he is the victim of physiological stimuli over which be has no control. Such 
an individual in Shaffer's account (e.g., in his assumption about how a behaviorist 
or materialist would deal with the ,folation of the stated moral principle) could be 
charged wilh acting in violation of the principle that no one should ever inflict great 
pain on another against his will for one's own amusement. For, when we want to 
detennioe whether the agent did such and such an action in violation of this 
principle, we must concern ourselves with an analysis of the intentions or purposes 
or the agent (as is already implied by ShaHer's statement of the principle) and not 
with the effects brought about by his behavior. The rele'1ance of a dualistic in­
terpretation of man's being is already implicitly present in the statement of a 
unh crsal moral principle and the presumption that human beings can deliberately 
inflict mffering for the sake of something. Both the behaviorist and the identity 
theorist can accept such a moral principle. The problem is that they would have 
great difficulty in determining the relationship between the agent's intention or 
purpose (for the behaviorist this is clearly inaccessible and for the identity theorist 
it would have to be a physical event which itself had a prior material cause) and his 
hehavior. IL  seems to me that neither the strict behaviorist nor the materialist can 
lcgitimatdy hold that there is a self-conscious I or person who initiates any type of 
behavior. Herein lies the paradoxical nature of lheir interpretation of man's being 
or nature vis-a-vis ethical prescriptions, moral responsibility, or moral judgments 
about human action. 
Contrary to Jerome Shaffer's views, it seems to me that (a) behaviorism could be 
true and (b) materialism could be true and (c) the moral principle cited could, in a 
sense, be true. That is, such a principle could be adopted as a more or less runiv�rsal 
claim aboul what one ought not to do even though behaviorism and-or materialism 
could be true. The problem is nol that behavi,orism or materialism logically negates 
the claims of er hies or of morality, but that tbe consequences of a strict 
behaviorism or materialism seem to make ethical principles and judgments 
irrelevant for an understanding of human behavior. Both or these theories put in 
jeopardy the validity or the jus11fication of morality in human life. What probably 
would have to be subst�tuted for a rational or emotive basis of morality would be an 
arbitrary pragmatic justification of certain types of behavior or responses in terms 
of the promotion of the convenience of behavioral organisms or pbysio-chemical 
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entities. Such entities would be programmed or conditioned to act in cercain ways 
for whatever practical benefits would presumably be derived from acting in these 
ways. Certainly, there could be no such things as intrinsic good or intrinsic evil. 
There is nothing in a strict behaviorism or materialism which prohibits moral 
nihilism - except the presumptive "utility" which some identity theorists seem to 
believe can be derived from a materialist conception of man. 
Most ethical theories require that a moraUy responsible individual be capable of 
deliberation. choice, and resol uteness. Moreover, there is the general assumption 
that each individual has at least a degree of freedom of choice, can willfully choose 
lO do what is right or wrong. These assumptions imply the existence of a conscious, 
self-re flective individual who has the capacity to initiate choices, decisions, and 
actions. Clearly. only a dualistic interpretation of man's being (despite its dif­
ficullies) is compatible with most conceptions of man as a morally responsible 
bei11g. 
Aside from the provocative question of the ethical implications of various at­
tempts to explicate the mind-body problem, there are a number of epistemic dif­
ficulties which are associated with a strict behaviorism and, a fortiori, with 
materialism or the identity-thesis. One of these difficulties seems to be related 
specifically to the kind of analysis which Roderick Firth offers in his response to 
Shaffer's paper. That is, the notion that although one firmly believes that one is in 
pain this belief is corrigible. This scepticism about one's own subjective judgment 
that one is in pain has always struck me as somewhat odd. For, if it were granted 
1ha1 l could be in doubt tbat I am now experiencing a sensation of pain, could I not 
also extend this scepticism to a// sensations? If I could be in error in averring that I 
am in pain (a sensation notorious for its intensity), could I not be in error in all of 
my perceptual judgments, in all of my claims about immediate sensations? It seems 
to me that the assertion that the sensation of pain is corrigible tends tto undermine 
any empirical claim whatsoever. Unless one were willing lo hold a view similar to 
Peirce's fallibilism (a view which is not in vogue today, especially amongst those 
who agree with Norman Malcolm that il is possible to know that something is the 
case in a strong sense of 'know' which precludes doubt even though what is 
"known" to be the case is based upon perception of an empirical phenomenon), the 
warranted certainty of the veracity of some sensations or perceptions (which 
Roderick Firth alludes to) would be unfounded. Since. according to the identity 
thesis, every sensation is a brain-state, if one brain-state is corrigible (e.g., the brain­
state experienced as pain). then all are. Some defenses of the identity-thesis lead to 
a radical scepticism concerning the veracity of sensation and perception which 
reintroduces all of the "problems of the external world" which plagued the various 
forms of idealism. Moreover, such scepticism ought to be consistently extended to 
the scientific observations which are the empirical basis upon which the identity­
thcsis is founded. For, are not the protocol statements of scientific investigators 
also corrigible brain-states of each observer? To be sure, Firth is quite right in 
holding that our beliefs about physical objects are based upon "reasons" or 
"evidence". But our belief that we are perceiving physical objects is itself based 
upon immediate sensory experiences which we assume to be veridical. If, as Firth 
remarks, the brain may be an "indeterministic system", then he has attributed to 
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the materialist position an implicit scepticism which is even more radical than that 
'' hich 1 believe is implicit in the materialist view. For, il the brain were in· 
deterministic in its funcrioning, then not only coordinated actions, but coordlinated 
observations and judgments would either be unlikely to occur or would be the 
resuh of a remarkable coincidence. 
There is one final remark 1 would like to make concerning some epistemic 
difficulties of the identity thesis. Since all of our "mental states" or "states of 
consciousness" are presumed to be actual or possible brain-states and-or processes. 
n serious problem concerning our knowledge of external phenomena seems en· 
tailed by the postulation of the identity thesis. For. it would seem that any given 
brain process that is reported as a sensory expedence cannot be shown to be a 
veridical perception of any actually existing physical object or external 
phenomenon. 
Thus. for example, ilf an individual is asked on a particular occasion ro report 
what he is perceiving amd he says, "A yellow, rectangular sheet of paper," and if this 
same individual was subsequently stimulated in a previously determined portion of 
his brain in such a way that he would again report that he was perceiving a yellow, 
rectangular sheet of paper. both reports would be perfectly accurate e"en though, 
in 1he latter case, there was, of course, no external phenomenon to be perceived. 
Of course. we do not need such artificial cases to indicate this difficulty since there 
is ultimately no way of knO\\ing what the actual properties of physical objects are if 
all "experiences" of such phenomena are ontologically private brain-states or brain· 
processes. Iotersubjective verification or confirmation cannot help us here since it 
is not possible for two perceivers (or "physio-chemical mechanisms") to have or 
C!:tperience the same brain-states. The ostensible "publicly observable plhysical 
object" (which J. J. C. Smart mentions in his "Sensations and Brain Processes") 
canno1 be known to exist if the identity thesis is valid. Ultimately, it seems to me, 
the identity rhesis leads to a paradoxical position which I would describe as 
material subjectivity. The attempt to obviate this kind of difficulty by arguing, as 
WiHrid Sellars has done, that there are "brain state universals" is highly 
questionable. The very notion of a maten'al universal is surely peculiar since it 
treats universals as if they could be public pti1cnomena. Perhaps one could argue 
1hat certain patterns of brain processes have developed throughout man's 
"evolution" which have proved to be more or Jess successful for the preservation of 
the species, the acquisition of skills, and the most effective orientation of man 
towards his nature environment or Umwelt. But this kind of speculation becomes 
as exotic as Nietzsche's claim that the "ca1egories of the understanding•• have 
acquired validity in terms of their purely pragmatic value for man's adaptation co 
thf! world in which be finds himself. 
The basic value of dualistic conceptions of man is that they enable us to account 
for the fondamental intentional and purposive basis of action. The behaviorist who 
refers to hypo1berical dispositions to act in this way or thaL, who attends only to 
publicly observable phenomena, has difficulty in dealing with the apparent in· 
1en1ionality of an individual. his capaci1y for choice, selective responses, 
dt!libcration. self·reflex:ive states of consciousness, the motivational nisus of human 
behavior, and. ironically, the interpretive and purposive activity of the 
54 
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behaviorialistic observer himself. There is. furthermore, the problem of identifying 
certain states of being which do not elicit any clear·cut behavioral criteria at all 
(e.g., doubting, believing, imagining, etc.). Usually, it is what is inaccessible to 
others which is most signficanr in determining how we act. Our subjectively 
significant projects or life·goals may conceivably never be revealed to another and 
yet they often function as the spiritual basis of our existence, the subjectively 
posited telos which may be our ra ison d'etre. To such spiritual states of being we 
do. indeed. have privileged access. 
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